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CASE NOTES
eastern states28 also gives administrative authorities great latitude and dis-
cretion in the dispensing of public funds. Most of these statutes also are
silent on the question of need arising solely and initially from a labor
strike. Because public policy underlying statutory enactment is individu-
ally determined in each state,29 it is difficult to speculate what effect, if
any, the current interpretation of the Illinois Public Assistance Code will
have in these other jurisdictions. Each state court will have to weigh the
similarities and differences between its statute and the Illinois Public As-
sistance Code.
However, in Illinois, the impact of the Strat-O-Seal Manufacturing v.
Scott decision is clear. The appellate court judicially has sanctioned the
administrative policy of allowing strikers, who are otherwise eligible for
public assistance, to receive public aid when their need arises solely by
reason of a labor strike. This decision, in addition to financially involving
the state in labor disputes,30 gives strikers a substantive, unchallengeable
right to such aid. Organized labor now can assure its members that they
will be able to maintain a level of subsistence during periods of labor
strikes. This right only can be impaired by a legislative amendment to the
Public Assistance Code.
Ronald Greenberg
28 N.Y. SOCIAL WELFARE LAW ANN. art. 5, tit. 1, § 131 (Thompson 1966); Omo Rvv.
CODE ch. 5113, § 5113.04 (1954); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 2508.1 (Cum. Supp. 1965).
29 Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Moll, 115 Ind. App. 289, 58 N.E.2d 947 (1945).
30 Supra note 13.
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-FAILURE TO USE SEAT BELTS
HELD NOT TO CONSTITUTE A DEFENSE
The plaintiff brought an action against the driver of the automobile in
which she was riding for injuries sustained by her when it collided with
another automobile. The defendant asserted the defense that the plaintiff
was contributorily negligent because of her failure to fasten the seat belt
which was provided for her. After granting the plaintiff's motion to strike
the defendant's defense, the jury awarded damages to the plaintiff. The
District Court of Appeals of Florida affirmed the trial court by holding
that a defendant cannot offer to the jury evidence of the plaintiff's failure
to use a seat belt as constituting a defense to gross negligence on the part
of the defendant driver. Brown v. Kendrick, 192 So.2d 49 (Fla. 1966).
Brown v. Kendrick is the first appellate court case in which the defense
arising out of a plaintiff's failure to use a seat belt has been decided. The
purpose of this note will be to trace the treatment of the problems spring-
ing from a plaintiff's failure to use a seat belt and the effect that this higher
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court's decision will have upon them. In order to accomplish this, the dis-
cussion will concern itself with the present effectiveness of seat belts, the
attitude of trial courts toward their use, the reasoning of the court in de-
ciding the instant case, and the effect which the Florida Appellate Court's
reasoning is having or will have upon other states confronted with the
same issue.
Safety officials in the United States are convinced that seat belts do save
lives1 and that their increased usage would save even more lives. 2 The use
of seat belts has increased' but a painfully small average percentage4 in
current use by the motorists is a cause for concern.5 Recognizing the safety
feature of scat belts, thirty-three states and the District of Columbia have
enacted seat belt legislation; 6 however, none of these jurisdictions provide
for the mandatory use of seat belts in passenger cars.7
Prior to the Brown decision, several trial courts have either fined motor-
ists for their failure to use seat belts or denied them recovery when they
were involved in accidents while not wearing them. Such a fine was levied
upon a motorist in Elkhart County, Indiana, after he pleaded guilty to a
1 The use of seat belts saved between 800 and 1,000 lives in 1965. NATIONAL SAFETY
COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 53 (1966).
2 Full use of seat belts would save at least 5,000 lives per year. Ibid.
3 The net use of seat belts has risen from five per cent in 1962 to sixteen per cent
in 1966. Ibid.
4 On the average, only thirty per cent of motorists in the United States use the scat
belts provided for them. Ibid.
5 Time, April 1, 1966, p. 26.
632 Fed. Reg. 2408-16 (1967); ARK. STAT. ANN. 5§ 75-733-734 (Supp. 1965); CALIF.
VEH. CoDE ANN. §§ 27300-302 (West 1960); CONN. STAT. ANN. § 14-100a (1963); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 317.951 (Supp. 1966); GA. CODE ANN. § 68-1801 (Supp. 1966); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 951 § 217.1 (1965); IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-2241-2243 (1965); IOWA CODE ANN.
S 321.445 (1966); IAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-5, 135 (Supp. 1965); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29,
§ 1368-a (Supp. 1966); MD. ANN. CODE art. 66 § 296a (Supp. 1966); MAss. GEN. LAws
ANN. ch. 90 § 7, ch. 94 § 295y (Supp. 1966); MICH. STAT. ANN. S 9.2410(1) (1960); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 169.685 (Supp. 1966); Miss. CODE ANN. § 8254.5 (Supp. 1964); Mo. STAT.
ANN. § 304-555 (1963); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 32-21-150.1-150.3 (Supp. 1965); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 39:3-76.2 (Supp. 1966); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 64-20-75-76 (Supp. 1966);
N.Y. CONSOL. LAWS, VEH. AND TRAF. § 383 (McKinnev Supp. 1966); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 20-135.1-135.3 (1965); N.D. CENr. CODE § 39-21-41.1 (Supp. 1965); OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 4513.26.2 (1965); OKLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 47 §§ 12-413-415 (Supp. 1966);
ORE. REV. STAT. ch. 315 §§ 443.482, 483.991 (1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75 § 843 (1960);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 31-23-39, 41 (Supp. 1966); TENN. CODE ANN. 5 59-930 (Supp.
1966); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-148.10 (Supp. 1966); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 4 (29)
(Supp. 1965); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.1-309.1-310 (Supp. 1966); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
S 46.37.510 (Supp. 1966); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 17c-15-43 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 347.48
(Supp. 1966).
7 Rhode Island is the only state which requires the use of seat belts but such use
is required only in certain government and public service vehicles. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN.
§ 31-23-41 (Supp. 1966).
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charge of failing to wear his seat belt while in a motor vehicle. The trial
judge reasoned that the Indiana statute requiring the installation of seat
belts8 implied their mandatory use by passengers.9 A similar interpretation
of the Wisconsin statute requiring the installation of "seat belts 10 by the
Circuit Court for Sheboygan County, Wisconsin, in the case of Stockinger
v. Dunisch1 ' was the reason for reducing the plaintiff's award of damages
by ten percent, as that was the amount of negligence the jury attributed to
her from her failure to use her seat belt. A subsequent trial court case in
the State of Wisconsin, Busick v. Budner,12 resulted in a total denial of re-
covery for the plaintiff where the jury was instructed by the judge that
the plaintiff's failure to fasten her seat belt could be considered to consti-
tute contributory negligence on her part. A Texas jury reached the same
conclusion in the case of Vernon v. Droeste13 by finding the plaintiff, who
had failed to use the harness and seat belt device in his automobile, to be
ninety-five percent contributorily negligent.
The court's interest in fining motorists or penalizing claimants as it has
done in the above mentioned trial court cases is to promote highway safety
by requiring the use of seat belts; however, doing so may be subverting
essential and formerly well established principles of law. An indication of
this came from the Florida District Court of Appeals treatment of the
problems arising from nonuse of seat belts in the case of Brown v. Ken-
drick. While the Florida seat belt statute1 4 contains the word "use," as does
the Indiana and Wisconsin statutes, none of the statutes expressly state that
the motorists must use them. 15 Unlike the Indiana and Wisconsin -trial
courts, the Florida court in the Brown case refused to imply that their use
was required. In doing so, the Florida court adhered to the well established
doctrine of separation of powers, characteristic of United States govern-
ment, in that it refrained from adding anything not expressly stated within
the statute' 6 or expanding its meaning to include something which was not
8 IND. STAT. ANN. § 47-2241 (1965).
9 La Porte Herald-Argus, Dec. 3, 1964, p. 6, col. 1-2.
10 WIs. STAT. ANN. § 347.48 (Cum. Supp. 1967).
11 Civil No. 981, C. C. for Sheboygan County, Wisconsin, Oct., 1964.
12 Civil No. 381.602, C. C. for Milwaukee County, Wisconsin, Civ. Branch 5, Dec.,
1965.
13 Civil No. 17205, D. C. of Brazos County, Texas, 85th Jud. Dist., June, 1966.
14 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 317.951 (Supp. 1966).
15 By comparison, a New York safety statute requiring motorcyclists to have
crash helmets and face guards expressly requires their use as well. N.Y. SEss. LAws
ch. 979 §§ 6-7 (1966).
16 In re Hewett's Estate, 153 Fla. 137, 13 So.2d 904 (1943); People v. Moore, 229 Cal.
App. 2d 221, 40 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1964); Robertson v. Robertson, 217 S.W.2d 132 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1949).
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evidenced by the express terms of the statute.1' Thus, the court made it
clear that it would not usurp the function of the Florida legislature to pro-
mote highway safety by requiring the use of seat belts when such use was
not expressly provided for by the existing statute. It necessarily follows,
then, that the Indiana and Wisconsin trial courts have subverted their tra-
ditional concept of separation of powers in an attempt to promote highway
safety through implying mandatory seat belt use from their statutes.
After eliminating the possibility of making the plaintiff negligent for her
failure to use her seat belt through interpretation of Florida's existing seat
belt legislation, the Florida court went on to consider the question of
whether or not the defense of contributory negligence for failure to use a
seat belt was one which could be argued on its merits before the jury.
In order for a cause of action based upon negligence to go to a jury or
have a final verdict be determined by a jury, the court as a trier of issues
of law, must first determine if the facts support the allegation; or, could
the court "affix some element of negligence for the failure to use . ."Is a
seat belt? To determine this the court noted that there was a controversy
over the safety feature of seat belts and that neither the Florida legislature
nor the United States Congress had enough information on their effective-
ness to make their use mandatory.19 On this basis, the court concluded
that the effectiveness of seat belts in preventing injury or death was con-
jectural. Since an allegation of negligence cannot be based on mere con-
jecture or surmise, 20 the court held that it was not error for the trial court
to refuse to allow the evidence of the plaintiff's failure to use the seat belt
to go to the jury. By such refusal, the trial court had in effect sustained a
demurrer to the defense thereby rendering it inadequate in law.21
The position of the Florida court as to whether or not the failure to use
a seat belt presented an adequate issue of law was exactly opposite to the
view taken by the Supreme Court of South Carolina in the case of Sams v.
Sams.22 In discussing the trial court's striking the defendant's allegation of
17 Radio Tel. Communication, Inc. v. Southeastern Tel. Co., 170 So.2d 577 (Fla. 1964);
Silverman v. City Eng'r Const. Co., 338 I11. 154, 170 N.E. 250, aff'd 252 Ill. App. 275
(1929); Thruway Motel of Ardsley v. Hellman Motel Corp., 170 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1958);
Ex parte Malcolm M. Levinson, 160 Tex. Cr. R. 606, 274 S.W.2d 76 (1955); State ex rel.
Muttek v. Langlade County, 204 Wis. 311, 236 N.W. 125 (1931).
i8 Brown v. Kendrick, 192 So.2d 49, 51 (Fla. 1966). 19 Ibid.
20 Kapp v. Bob Sullivan Chevrolet Co., 234 Ark. 395, 353 SAV.2d 5 (1962); Miller v.
Dexheimer, 37 111. App. 2d 295, 185 N.E.2d 519 (1962); Towt v. Pope, 168 Cal. App.
2d 520, 336 P.2d 276 (1959); Jones v. Hunt, 208 N.Y.S.2d 581, aff'd 13 App. Div. 2d 1012,
218 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (1963).
21 Seven-Up Bottling Co. v. Grocery Drivers Union, 40 Cal. 2d 368, 254 P.2d 544
(1953).
22247 S.C. 467, 148 S.E.2d 154 (1966).
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the plaintiff's contributory negligence for failure to use a seat belt, the
South Carolina Supreme Court stated that:
The question before us is whether the pleading should have been stricken, or,
on the other hand, should the defendant be allowed to prove, if he can, that the
failure of the plaintiff to use a seat belt, under the facts and circumstances of
this case, amounted to a failure to exercise such due care as a person of ordi-
nary reason and prudence would have exercised under the same circumstances,
and that such failure constituted a contributing proximate cause of the plain-
tiff's injuries. We think that the pleading should not have been stricken and
that the ultimate questions raised by the alleged defense should be decided in
the light of all of the facts and circumstances adduced upon the trial, rather
than being decided simply on the pleadings.23
From this divergent treatment comes the inception of two methods of
solving the problem of seat belt usage in tort law. By ascribing to the posi-
tion taken by the District Court of Appeals of Florida in the Brown case,
the question is decided as a matter of law; however, by following the South
Carolina Supreme Court's holding in the Sams case, the questition becomes
one of fact to be argued before a jury or the court.
Although it is at odds with the decision in the Sams case, the Florida
Court unnecessarily went on to point out one of the difficulties encoun-
tered in adopting the reasoning in Sams-the factual problem of ascertain-
ing contributory negligence. It is apparent that the element of proximate
cause is missing where a claimant has been injured in an automobile acci-
dent without his or her seat belt fastened because one cannot say that
the failure to use it caused the accident and that but for the nonuse of the
seat belt the accident would not have occurred. It is a widely held view
that in order for contributory negligence to bar recovery it must be shown
that the plaintiff's act or omission was the proximate cause of his injury.24
Thus, the alternative to the Brown case does not ease the difficulty of
promoting highway safety through penalizing motorists for nonuse of
seat belts since the existing law can infer no liability upon nonusers. 25
Without having to decide the issue of contributory negligence, the
Florida court has shown a way for other courts to follow which will
provide an easier answer to the problem of seat belt usage in tort law.
However, the means adopted by the court does not answer the overriding
23 1d. at 470, 148 S.E.2d at 155.
24 Camp v. Polk, 26 Conn. Sup. 263, 219 A.2d 72 (1965); Arendt v. Tallman, 10 Ill. App.
2d 66, 134 N.E.2d 120 (1956); Holt v. Bills, 189 Kan. 261, 366 P.2d 1009 (1961); Balti-
more County v. State, 232 Md. 350, 193 A.2d 30 (1962); George v. Wheeler, 404 S.W.2d
426 (Mo. 1966); Ramirez v. Perlman, 131 N.Y.S.2d 124, rev'd 284 App. Div. 82, 130
N.Y.S.2d 398 (1954); Loehr v. Crocker, 191 Wis. 422, 211 N.W. 299 (1926).
25 For a discussion of the possible application of the doctrines of contributory neg-
ligence and avoidable consequences to reduce the damages awarded to a plaintiff who
fails to fasten his seat belt, see Kavanagh v. Butorac, 221 N.E.2d 824 (Ind. App. 1966).
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problem of increasing highway safety and reducing injuries and fatalities
on the nation's highways. The problem of nonuse of seat belts as a defense
in tort actions must be met with more than an eager intimation for legis-
lative action 26 to make use mandatory and the easy disposition of a defense
on the basis of its being conjectural and thereby inadequate in law.
John Simon
26 The National Safety Council is in the process of drafting a model seat belt code
requiring the use of seat belts which it may distribute to state legislatures at their request
after its final approval. Conversation with Mr. Edwin Kirby of the National Safety
Council in Chicago, February 21, 1967.
TRUSTS AND ESTATES-DISPOSITIVE EFFECT OF PERSONAL
RECEIPT CLAUSES ON REMAINDER INTERESTS
Testatrix established a spendthrift trust wherein one half of the income
was to go to a friend for life with a remainder in testatrix's adopted son.
The will further provided that in the event the son did not live to collect
the remainder, it was to go to testatrix's brother and sister, or the survivor of
them. A spendthrift clause contained a statement that any payments were
to be made in person or upon the personal receipt of the beneficiary. The
adopted son, the brother, and the sister died before the remainder interest
could be distributed upon the death of the life tenant. The trial court held
that the personal receipt language of the spendthrift clause had no dis-
positive effect and ordered distribution to be made one half to the brother's
estate and one half to the sister's. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed
the trial court's holding. Northern Trust Co. v. North, 73 Ill. App. 2d
469, 220 N.E.2d 28, appeal denied, 222 N.E.2d v (1966).
The Illinois courts have held, in the three cases in which it was gn issue,'
that a personal receipt clause in a spendthrift clause had the effect of re-
quiring the individual named in the remainder to be living at the termina-
tion of the life estate in order to claim the interest. The Illinois courts have
not been alone in this view. The four other states2 which have considered
the effect of a personal receipt clause on distribution have likewise held
that the remaindermen must be alive at the termination of the life estate.
Northern Trust Co. v. North is therefore an important case in that it rep-
resents a marked departure in the effect given these clauses.
I Routt v. Newman, 253 111. 185, 97 N.E. 208 (1912); First Nat'l Bank of Chicago v.
Cleveland Trust Co., 308 Ill. App. 639, 32 N.E.2d 964 (1941); Cowdery v. Northern
Trust Co., 321 Ill. App. 243, 53 N.E.2d 43, appeal denied, 326 I1.App. xiii (1944).
2 California, Massachusetts, Nevada, and Pennsylvania. Union Nat'l Bank of Pasadena
v. Hunter, 93 Cal. App. 2d 669, 209 P. 2d 621 (1949); Hemenway v. Hemenway, 171
Mass. 42, 50 N.E. 456 (1898); Barringer v. Gunderson, 81 Nev. 288, 402 P. 2d 470 (1965);
In re Nixon's Estate, 306 Pa. 261, 159 Atl. 442 (1932).
